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Abstract 
Future issues - human rights and freedom, democracy as a fundamental principle of life, higher living stand-
ards, greater level of security - these are basic questions to which is directed collective energy of European 
societies. The fulfillment of these conditions is placed as a task in all transitional societies which want to join 
the EU. The issue of post-conflict societies, however, is a challenge to the theoretical and the pragmatic level, 
especially if the sources of conflict are in areas such as ethnic or confessional. For some of these societies, it is 
difficult to be classified into a group of post-conflict societies because a social conflict in them, which they still 
have, has the intensity that puts them in conflict societies. The case of BiH society is, by its manifestations, a 
characteristic example of just such a society. And it is, and also some of the issues related to European values 
in conflict societies, in the center of analysis in this paper. And what is most important, all these issues are 




Connecting to European system of values is 
ambition of major part of European transitional 
societies. It is true, and that will show every seri-
ous analysis, that there are significant differences 
in level of manifestation of presented ambition, 
especially in correlation with commitment of 
renunciation of values, or at least one among 
them, which are in those societies immanent for 
decades or even longer. If we deeply analyze 
theoretical analyses of post conflict societies, 
shown differences are more obvious. Countries, 
for example, emerged from the disintegration of 
the SFRY can serve as one of examples. One of 
them, Slovenia, had become member of EU in 
May 2004. In July 2013. Croatia will also gain 
same status as Slovenia. But significant delay, in 
comparison with them, it can be seen by Serbia 
and Montenegro. But, development process as 
trend in near future also in not disputable. Con-
dition in other countries, which are formed after 
disintegration of former mutual country, is seri-
ous. Macedonia, Kosovo and in the end Bosnia 
and Herzegovina could not be treated as post 
conflict societies. Totally opposite, and every 
serious analyze would show that time of conflict 
is not part of their past then it is a serious prob-
lem with which they live today, and it will be 
forced in the foreseeable future. In the context of 
empirical survey, in middle of theoretical interest 
it was Bosnia and Herzegovina as country and as 
society. And it is classical example of postwar, 
but also post conflict society. Or, even more con-
crete, end of war didn’t mean also end of conflict. 
Nay, they continued also after war – now admit-
tedly with other methods and means, using in-
struments from pallet of instruments of political 
democracy. Empirical survey, however, it was 
not directed on conflict as a style of life but on 
some other orientations, on which society con-
flicts have significant impact. In concrete case, as 
survey subject was questions of different types of 
identifications – ethnical and identification with 
different types physical belonging, questions of 
regionalization as Bosnian and Herzegovinian 
orientation and in the end, integration in EU as a 
final goal of BIH as a country. 
Survey's hypotheses were: shown level of read-
iness for integration in European political, social and 
civilizational area is not followed by same intensity of 
individual and social identification with Europe in 
Bosnian and Herzegovina society /1/. Empirical 
data, needed for theoretical conclusion, was col-
lected with questionnaire on representative pop-
ulation on whole area in BiH. In this analyze, 
concentration is only at one characteristic of 
readiness BiH citizens for integration in Europe-
an political, social and civilizational area – be-
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tween their ethnical belonging and shown readi-
ness. 
Identity as an ethnic and geographical de-
terminants 
Question of collective identities is, for sure – 
survey begun with that as assumption – one of 
the most important for citizens of BiH. It was 
assumed, that because of character of social con-
flicts, national identity is unquestionable. As-
sumption is, for sure, from perspective of level of 
total population but also from members of three 
constitutive nations empirically wholly con-
firmed (Graph 1). 
 
 
In stressed assessment, it's needed to stress 
two more details. If it's shown separately, signifi-
cant of national identity is relatively the most 
prominent at citizens of Serbian nationality, and 
also what it could be expected, at Bosnian Mus-
lims.  In the other hand, if we can speak about 
significant deviation from general situation, it is 
only with those who doesn't belong neither one 
of three ethnic groups – whom members de-
clared as members of national minors or as na-
tional undecided citizens ( in further analyses – 
„others“). However, their percentage in whole 
population is, by all seriously assessments – be-
cause real data are not available due non-
implemented census – is irrelevant, so shown 
deviation does not have significant theoretical 
meaning. In expressed general opinion, however, 
it is necessary to add two more details. If they 
are observed separately, importance of national 
identity is relatively most pronounced among the 
citizens of Serbian nationality, which is also ex-
pected, with the Bosnian Muslims. So, question 
of national identity was not doubtful, because 
their high percentage of importance was as-
sumed, lot more interesting, from the beginning, 
was level of importance of some other Bosnian 
and Herzegovinian citizens identities – level of 
theirs identification with Europe, Balkan, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, their entities and regional 
belonging or even local community in which 
they live. Gained empirical results are also intri-
guing. Survey also begun with assumption that 
could exist significant level of identification of 
Bosnian and Herzegovinian citizens with Eu-
rope. Empirical indicators are under expectation. 
Identification with Europe is not disputable at 
2/5 of total adult citizens. It's also true that there 
is significant potential in 1/5 of BiH population – 
those which is characterized as undecided. But, 
theoretical provocation is surely in fact that even 
2/5 of total BiH population does not explicit iden-
tify itself with Europe. And that means that 
among that part of population could be tomor-
row opponents of joining BiH of EU (Graph 2). 
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It's interesting, for sure, question where to look 
for reasons of absence this kind of identification? 
By the empirical results, debatable is not only 
European identification of group „others“and BiH 
Croats /2/. Also it could be significant European 
identification by Bosnian part of population – 
especially by identification between neutral part 
of this ethnic group.Politicians should be worried 
by level of identification which is noticed at Serbi-
an ethnic group. Just little over 1/5 of this part of 
population, in moment of survey, was ready to 
identify itself with Europe. The way of making 
decisions in BiH could, because of that fact, create 
problems in ambition of caching European inte-
gration train. In difference of identification with 
Europe, identification with Balkan is, when it is 
considered meaning of all adult citizens of BiH, is 
relatively pronounced. It’s non-questionable by 
half of total adult population. And not just that. 
Possibility of this type of identification, with co-
ordinated political, media and other aspects of 
acting, it should not be excluded at 2/5 of total 
population. It is characteristic, in the end, that 
level of identification with Balkan, if it's observed 
between individual ethnical groups, at three of 
constitutive nations almost identical (Graph 3). 
 
 
And what is with identification with its 
own country? Can we say today, because of type 
of conflicts which were in BiH in past two and a 
half centuries, about identification which could be 
considered enough guarantees for future of BiH 
as a country and as a society? On the level of total 
population that identification could be. Confirma-
tion of that shows two groups of data. Over 3/5 of 
total population identify itself with BiH as its own 
country. Besides that, at just 15% of respondents is 
identified – shown in different intensity – lack of 
stated identification (Graph 4). 
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Prevailing identification can't form conclusion 
that BiH, as it is now, is outside of any kind of 
danger for its existence. As confirmation of that 
stands some results from Graph above. It's obvi-
ous that identification with BiH as a country and 
society – in form that exist today – by constitutive 
nations in BiH, is not questionable, maybe just by 
citizens of Bosnian Muslims as ethnic group. By 
Croats, and especially by Serbs, it cannot be said 
about that kind of identification. It’s true that at 
relatively significant part of population and by 
this ethnic groups it can still notice negative iden-
tification in identification with its own country 
/3/. And that means that with right ethnical and 
country strategy could significantly affect on 
growth of identification of attachment at all of this 
ethnical groups. Shown image of identification 
with its own country by itself produce question of 
identification with one of two its administrative 
parts – entities, which are product of BiH war 
cataclysm? And what is with that identification? 
Is it higher or lower in comparison with one stat-
ed before, and does it exist any differences be-
tween major ethnical groups which are, by this 
survey, tested? At first sight on empirical data, 
can be concluded that by major part of BiH popu-
lation is developed identification with one of two 
administrative parts of country – entities in which 
they live. That, for sure, is not something out of 
expectation. Entities are part of BiH reality almost 
two centuries, so it's logical identification with 
them (Graph 5.) 
 
 
It's also important distribution of shown 
identification on separate ethnical communities. 
For sure, the most pronounced level of identifica-
tion with its own entity is by citizens of Serbian 
nationality. And that means – because of 9/10 of 
this ethnical group in BiH live on area of one enti-
ty – that they view that entity as separate entity, 
separate country. This kind of view, on the end, is 
reasonable because of every day messages of that 
type emitted from Serbian politicians in BiH. Also, 
relatively smallest – by category „others“ for this 
kind of self-identification is reasonable - identifi-
cation with entity is by citizens of Croatian na-
tionality. Why? Although survey doesn't offer 
ground for conclusion, is possible to assume that 
in neither of two entities they doesn't recognize 
area or guarantee for its own national importance. 
If it's, based on whole population, non-
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questionable identification with administrative 
parts of country as a result of war conflicts and 
war control one of two parts of BiH, can we talk 
about same identification also in case existing 
awareness about belonging to a separate regional 
identity – which has whole longer history and it's 
in correlation with geographical, historical, traffic 
or economical regionalization of some parts of 
BiH? Results of empirical survey suggest confir-
mation. Or more concretely, over half of total 
population confirm existing such a consciousness 
as a part of its own identity (Graph 6). 
 
If we observe awareness of belonging to a sepa-
rate regional identity in ethnically structured stra-
ta, differences are more than recognizable. High 
awareness of regional identity in the group of 
"others", could of course before survey assumed. 
If, however, we compare the three dominant eth-
nic groups, the members of the three constituent 
people, awareness of belonging to a separate re-
gional identity was obviously in relation to the 
level of identification with the BiH. Or more con-
crete, the strongest identification with BiH, which 
is registered at Bosnian Muslims, as a result has 
some less emphasize on awareness of regional 
identity. And vice versa, lower level of identifica-
tion with BiH as country, recorded among Serbian 
and Croatian part of BiH population, results with 
stronger awareness about belonging to a separate 
regional identity. This type of regularity can’t be 
concluded without any reserve. Higher level of 
identification with BiH as a country compared 
with BiH Serbs, at Croatian citizens in BiH is not 
impediment for even most prominent awareness 
about their regional status. And vice versa, rela-
tively lower level of identification at citizens of 
Serbian nationality should be one of assumption 
of distinguished regional identity. However, by 
comparing it with the Croats in BiH, it did not 
happen. In the end, with this survey goal was also 
to test level of identification of BiH citizens with 
their local community. 
In the survey entered with assumption that that 
level of identification could be the most distin-
guished. Empirical results confirmed that as-
sumption. Identification is, at the level of total 
sample, spotted at over ¾ of total population. 
And also, by the way, differences among most 
significant ethnic strata are irrelevant (Graph 7). 
 
 
All Bosniaks Serbs Croats Other 
53.1 
45.6 






Graph 6: Awareness of belonging to a separate regional identity (in %): 
possess 
I do not own 
All Bosniaks Serbs Croats Other 
76.6 78.4 74 75 
100 
5.2 9.2 




Graph 7: The local community is mostly or completely (in %): 
identify 
not identify 
Nor identify or 
do not identify 
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If we want, in the end, based on empirical re-
search, preform some theoretical regularity, one of 
the arguments was unquestionable. The smaller 
geographical area is, on which and with whom 
identification of citizens is tested, the higher level 
of their identification is. Or more concrete, the 
strongest citizens identification with their local 
community, and relatively the smallest with Eu-
rope. Fall of identification could be followed even 
on area between these two geographical determi-
nants - from entities to the country and the Bal-
kan. In this regularity partly does not fit only 
awareness of regional identity as the narrow 
space of the two-level entities. But, in that case it 
possible to offer a relevant scientific argumenta-
tion.  Term “awareness of belonging to a separate 
regional identity” is, compared to others in tested 
identities as part of survey, relatively less defined, 
and with that is also relatively significant possibil-
ity of separately doubts on the question of what 
exactly is. Consequence of that fact is, result that 
differs from general theoretical regularity. 
 
 
2. Relationship to regional and European in-
tegration 
A higher degree of identification with a narrower 
geographic areas suggests that the relatively more 
could be expressed and readiness for cooperation 
and integration BiH in regional than in the gen-
eral European Association. And how much the 
empirical research is supporting this assumption? 
Results of survey, first of all, confirm assumption 
how between citizens of BiH exist agreement that 
political and economic cooperation between coun-
tries of west Balkan is not on level on which 
should and can be. Or more concrete, almost 3/5 
of total population share believes how achieved 
level of cooperation is not good or even bad. And 
that means that exist significant scope for its ex-
tension. In support of the same meaning, of 
course, stand two more indicators. Not even one 
fifth of total population, for example, don’t share 
same belief how for standing cooperation could it 
be stressed that is mostly or totally good. What is, 
more importantly, for the confidence of the citi-
zens cannot even be said that is explicitly painted 
negatively, or how the existing cooperation in the 
countries of western Balkan experiencing explicit-
ly bad.    (Graph 8).  
 
 
The similar conclusions, which is just as 
important, are reached through analyze of certain 
ethnic strata. Previously shown conclusions for 
level of country more or less are indicative for 
each of the three most dominant ethnic groups. If 
there are some differences, they do not have the 
intensity that they could be considered theoreti-
cally relevant. Although from the previous para-
graphs can be drawn conclusions about how, 
among the citizens, exist support towards inten-
sive cooperation of Bosnia and Herzegovina with 
its neighbors, and other countries of west Balkan, 
that kind of support is throughout empirical sur-
vey explicit confirmed. Over nine tenths of the 
All Bosniaks Serbs Croats Other 












Graph 8: Political and economic cooperation between the countries of the Western 
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total adult population, according to research – 
although with varying degrees of intensity – sup-
port cross-border cooperation in the countries of 
western Balkan. And also, stated support is un-




It is not questionable – although it is less 
than the previously identified – support to acces-
sion BiH to EU. Three quarters of citizens for join-




Conclusions stated before sends optimistically 
signals. But in them can be recognized signals of 
possible changes that could face BiH in near fu-
ture. It is interesting, for example, that integration 
BiH in EU relatively most intense confront citi-
zens of Serbian ethnic group. Past few years was 
marked by strong anti-European orientation and 
rhetoric of Serbian politicians in BiH. Conse-
quence of that orientation and rhetoric could not 
be nothing else then increased share of those who 
joining in EU don’t consider lucky or vise choice. 
Support joining EU, which is not disputable even 
on level of total sample or even on level of ethnic 
strata, also don’t mean neither expectation how 
joining to EU could solve all problem that country 
have. But, certain expectations are not disputable. 
What are those expectations? Observed on coun-
try level, that is, first of all, political and economic 
stability which would BiH joining to EU should 
get. This type of expectations is spotted at over 2/5 
of total population. It is not insignificant share of 
those who believe how integration for conse-
quence could have better living standard for citi-
zens of BiH. But, the others should not be ignored 
– those who from the admission to the EU does 
not expect any significant change to life in BiH. 
This is, more concrete, almost every third adult 
citizen of BiH (Graph 11). 
All Bosniaks Serbs Croats Other 
90.6 86 95.3 97 99.9 
7.1 10.4 4.7 3 0 1.6 
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Graph 9: Cross-border cooperation in the Western Balkans (%): 
Mostly or fully 
support 
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If we observe expectation from joining EU 
from level of analyzed ethnic stratum, differences 
are more than recognizable. Higher level of politi-
cal and economic stability is characteristic for 
citizens of Bosnian national group and for those 
who are treated as “others”. This type of expecta-
tion, although relatively with less intensity 
shown, characterizes also Croats in BiH. But the 
same could not be claimed in case of citizens of 
Serbian nationality. At this part of population is, 
totally contrary, dominant belief that joining EU 
for BiH will not bring some significant change. In 
the end, expectation that joining EU will bring 
better standard of living thanks to the citizens of 
Croatian ethnic group (Graph 12). Starting from 
unquestionable general commitment to joining 
EU and from dominant expectation how it could 
have positive effects on living of citizens, it is 
logical to ask the question does the citizens of BiH 
share same belief that the process of integrating 
their country in EU is delayed? And if they share, 
why is that process of integration delayed? Or 
more concrete, by citizens thinking, who is re-
sponsible for that slow tempo of integration? The 
result of the empirical research does not leave a 
large space for dilemmas. It’s registered, first of 
all, general social consensus related with that the 
process of integration BiH in EU is too slow /4/. 
Also there doesn’t exist doubts about who is con-
sidered to be responsible for that. Predominant is 
a belief that the greatest responsibility falls on the 
domestic politicians. Also responsible is consid-
ered international community. More than every 
fifth adult citizen marks it as responsible for BiH 
not being already member of EU. This distribu-
tion of responsibility, however, is not only charac-
terized by the total study sample included. Nay, 
same distribution – with minor deviation in inten-
sity of responsibility of domestic politicians or 
institutions of international community – it’s 
characteristics of the three largest ethnic strata, 
those that include in themselves members of the 
three constituent people (Graph 12). 
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total adult population, according to research – 
although with varying degrees of intensity – sup-
port cross-border cooperation in the countries of 
western Balkan. And also, stated support is un-




It is not questionable – although it is less 
than the previously identified – support to acces-
sion BiH to EU. Three quarters of citizens for join-




Conclusions stated before sends optimistically 
signals. But in them can be recognized signals of 
possible changes that could face BiH in near fu-
ture. It is interesting, for example, that integration 
BiH in EU relatively most intense confront citi-
zens of Serbian ethnic group. Past few years was 
marked by strong anti-European orientation and 
rhetoric of Serbian politicians in BiH. Conse-
quence of that orientation and rhetoric could not 
be nothing else then increased share of those who 
joining in EU don’t consider lucky or vise choice. 
Support joining EU, which is not disputable even 
on level of total sample or even on level of ethnic 
strata, also don’t mean neither expectation how 
joining to EU could solve all problem that country 
have. But, certain expectations are not disputable. 
What are those expectations? Observed on coun-
try level, that is, first of all, political and economic 
stability which would BiH joining to EU should 
get. This type of expectations is spotted at over 2/5 
of total population. It is not insignificant share of 
those who believe how integration for conse-
quence could have better living standard for citi-
zens of BiH. But, the others should not be ignored 
– those who from the admission to the EU does 
not expect any significant change to life in BiH. 
This is, more concrete, almost every third adult 
citizen of BiH (Graph 11). 
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Aim of this empirical survey was to relate 
inner turmoil in conflict societies at one side and 
European values which are for them immanent at 
the other side. On the example of BiH – which is, 
as characteristic example of conflict society used 
as surface for empirical research – goal was to 
investigate how much are – beside national identi-
ty as one of cause inner conflict, immanent same 
other identities – readiness to identify itself with 
local community, non-administrative natural 
parts and administrative parts in country, with 
country itself, wide region of Balkan and in the 
end, with Europe as a goal toward their politi-
cians, according to public manifestation, aspire. 
The study, due to the goals laid out, entered with 
the hypothesis that the reported level of readiness for 
integration into the European political, social and 
civilizational space does not follow the same intensity 
of individual and social identification with Europe 
within BiH society. To test the hypothesis empirical 
research was conducted on a representative sam-
ple of five hundred respondents, adult citizens 
from the area the entire country. Research pro-
duced two groups of cognitions. First is about 
question of identities. It is confirmed, first of all, 
assumption that national identity is not question-
able. With conducted research that assumption is 
confirmed. National identity is, as value indica-
tive for almost 85% of entire BiH population. It is 
surprisingly, but only partially, cognition that this 
kind of identity is relatively most significant 
among the citizens of the Serbian ethnic group, in 
which it's possible to talk about a general feature 
of. At the identity related to geographical area, 
research show regularity: narrower geographical 
area – higher level of identification. Or more con-
crete, most significant is identification of citizens 
with their local community, and relatively weak-
est with Europe as civilization framework which 
they, by their nature, belong. Shown regularity, 
does not mean also negative attitude of citizens 
BiH as members of conflict society, toward differ-
ent types of integration in EU. Nay, with survey is 
identified critical attitude to accomplished level of 
political and economic cooperation of countries 
from west Balkan and almost plebiscitary support 
to the intensification of cross-border cooperation 
between the countries of this region. It’s also stat-
ed ¾ support for joining EU because of benefits 
which could for BiH and all its citizens bring. And 
because of that, among other things, an indicative 
critical attitude towards the measures, which on 
the path of integration of BiH into the EU, take the 
politicians - domestic, primarily, but also the insti-
tutions of the international community, under the 
Dayton peace agreement, of course, are parts of 
the constitutional structure of BiH. 
 
Notes 
/1/ The survey was conducted in the period between 
20th November 2011. and 15th March 2012. Year. 
The study included 500 subjects - among them, 
49.8% were women and 50.2% men. The sample 
took into account the educational structure - in the 
sample is 0.4% of the population with no education, 
16.9% with primary school, 48.2% completed sec-
ondary school, and 34.3% with a college or universi-
ty. The sample is varied according to the criterion of 
working status - it is, in fact, 15.8% of the unem-
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ployed, 14.2% of employees in state institutions, 
13% of employees in public enterprises, 16.9% of 
employees in the private employer, 34.5% students 
and 5.3% of pensioners. In the sample are then rep-
resented by different social groups according to the 
criterion of average monthly income - without re-
ceiving them is 41.6%, with incomes up to 250 euro 
13.8%, those in the range of 250-500 euros, 24.3%, in 
range from 500-750 euros, 10.4% in the range of 750-
1000 euros and 5.5% above 1000 euros 4.1%. Among 
the respondents 32.2% of them belong to one of the 
political parties, and 67.8% of them is outside of this 
form of belonging. Care was taken, however, about 
regional dispersion of respondents - in the sample 
were 69.9% from the Federation of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, and 30.1% from Republic of Srpska area. 
Finally, special attention is paid to the national be-
longing - in the sample are included 49.4% Bosni-
ans, 29.6% Serbs, 19.7% Croats, and finally, 1.1% of 
members of national minorities and national unde-
cided citizens. 
/2/ For 66.6% of members of national minorities and 
nationally undeclared BiH citizens - that will in the 
analysis, and just because of economy of the space, 
use the term "others" - the national identity is most-
ly or absolutely meaningless. 
/3/ After all, 30% of Serbs and 25% Croats have identifi-
cation vague relationship - not identify itself or do 
not identify itself with BiH as a state and society. 
/4/ That kind of belief, in fact, not only have 1.1% of the 
total population, the part of BiH citizens who still 
believe that the process of integrating their coun-
tries to the EU is not slowed. 
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Sažetak 
Pitanja budućnosti – ljudska prava i slobode, demokracija kao temeljni princip života, viši živo-
tni standard, veći stupanj sigurnosti – temeljna su pitanja prema kojima je usmjerena kolektivna 
energija evropskih društava. Ispunjavanje tih uvjeta stavljeno je u zadatak i svim tranzicijskim 
društvima koja se žele pridružiti EU. Pitanje post-konfliktnih društava, međutim, je izazov i na 
teorijskoj i na pragmatičnoj ravni, posebice ako su izvori konflikta u sferama kakve su etničko 
ili konfesionalno. Neka od tih društava se, potom, teško i mogu svrstavati u skupinu post-
konfliktnih jer društveni konflikti u njima i danas imaju intenzitet koji ih svrstava u konfliktna 
društva. Slučaj bosansko-hercegovačkog društva je, po svojim manifestacijama, karakterističan 
primjer upravo takvog društva. A ono je, odnosno neka od pitanja koja se tiču evropskih vrije-
dnosti unutar konfliktnog društva, u središtu analize ovog rada. I što je najvažnije, sva ta pita-
nja su u vezi sa sustavom javnog komuniciranja. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
